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rule is applied.32 Furthermore, the Restatement, in a Comment, specifically re-
gards the rule as inapplicable unless there is a life estate created in the ances-
tor.33 Hence, the Restatement treats a devise to A for life, with remainder to his
heirs, as not within the operation of the rule if A predeceases the testator. Cer-
tainly, this position of the Restatement is in accord with any view of the rule
which emphasizes that the ancestor should take an estate of freehold. While the
development of the rule in Shelley's Case in England lends some support to the
decision in the Lydick case, in the absence of more persuasive precedent, the
position taken by the Restatement appears to be more desirable as limiting the
scope of an archaic and obsolete rule of property.
UNREALIZED APPRECIATION-COMMENTS ON
MODERN DIVIDEND STATUTES
Is surplus which represents unrealized appreciation of fixed assets legally
available for cash dividends?' In Randall v. Bailey such dividends were recently
held authorized under the provisions of the New York Stock Corporation Law.
The corporation had written up the value of its waterfront terminal property to
over five times its original cost. From 1929 through 1932 a generous dividend
policy was pursued even though the distributions considerably exceeded net
income for the period. If the company had not listed its fixed assets at the
appreciated value, the total of its liabilities and capital stock would have con-
siderably exceeded its total assets throughout the period in question. On April i,
1933, only eleven months after the last dividend distribution, the company
went into receivership, culminating in reorganization.
Section 58 of the New York Stock Corporation Law provides: "No stock
corporation shall declare or pay any dividend which shall impair its capital,
nor .... declare or pay any dividend .... unless the value of its assets re-
maining after the payment of such dividend .... shall be at least equal to the
aggregate amount of its debts and liabilities, including capital."12 The trustee
appointed in the reorganization proceeding sought to recover from directors of
2 3 Rest., Property § 312 (1940).
33 bid., at Comment c. Among the earlier writers, Kent is in accord with the Restatement.
4 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 259-6o (r4 th ed. x896). It seems likely that Kent was
relying on the authority of Blackstone, note iS supra. As to other writers, who in other con-
nections seem to imply the necessity for the ancestor to take a life estate, see i Hayes, Con-'
veyancing 542-46 (sth ed. x84o);. Kales op. cit. supra note 24, § 44o. Actually, whether or not
the position of the Restatement is adopted, where the ancestor predeceases the testator, many
American lapse statutes would limit the number of situations in which the problem might arise.
'288 N.Y. 280,43 N.E. (2d) 43 (1942).
2 N.Y. Stock Corp. Laws (McKinney, i94o) § 58.
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the corporation the amount of dividends claimed to violate this section. The
Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Supreme Court,3 held that Sec-
tion 58 requires a valuation of assets before each dividend declaration and that
in such valuations unrealized appreciation may be included. It therefore re-
fused to impose liability upon the directors.
The soundness of the court's construction of the statute has been discussed
elsewhere.4 This note will be devoted to the general questions of policy which
this decision raises. It may be urged in support of the rule of Randall v. Bailey
that if the revaluation has a sound basis in increased market values or earnings
prospects, creditors are not prejudiced by a dividend out of appreciation sur-
plus, since the remaining assets exceed the liabilities by the required margin.
The margin of safety principle rests, however, upon the assumption that credi-
tors need protection against shrinkages which may jeopardize the collection of
their claims. Fixed assets afford protection for creditors in two ways. In the
first place, theoretically the assets may be sold to provide funds for payment of
the debts-sold either by voluntary act of the corporation or under execution or
other legal process. More realistically, however, fixed assets afford creditor-
protection by maintaining the corporate income in order that its debts either
may be paid out of earnings or may be-refunded by new financing. From neither
of these points of view should surplus representing unrealized appreciation be
available for cash dividends. Such dividends represent an anticipation of the
profit on a possible sale or of the profit from future operations, leaving creditors
with the risk of future shrinkages.
This speculative aspect of dividends from unrealized appreciation is striking-
ly illustrated in Hayman v. Morris.5 This case involved a corporation whose as-
sets consisted of the stock of other corporations. The holding company had set
up "good will" on its books at an amount representing a capitalization of antici-
pated earnings of the subsidiaries in excess of "normal" earnings. The court
took the view that the surplus created by setting up this good will item was
available for cash dividends under the rule in Randall v. Bailey (although the
case actually involved not a dividend but a purchase by the company of its own
shares). Here, the company is obviously anticipating the expected profits of the
future and leaving creditors with the risk that the expectations may be dis-
appointed.
If cash dividends out of unrealized appreciation of fixed assets so obviously
violate the margin of safety principle, why is it that legislatures of many im-
3 223 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 173 (S. Ct. I94O).
4 Valuation of Assets to Determine Dividend Legality-the Bush Terminal Case, So Yale
L.J. 3o6, 3o9-Ic (1940); Dohr, Randall v. Bailey-Review of Decision, 70 J. of Accountancy
564 (194o). Bonbright anticipated the court's construction. 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Prop-
erty 924 (1937).
5 36 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 756 (S. Ct. 1942).
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portant states have left the question open 6 and that the New York court has
construed an ambiguous statute as authorizing the practice? The answer may
be that, while the margin principle has never been directly challenged, it has
never been wholeheartedly accepted by businessmen, courts, or legislatures. It
is easy to understand why this has been the case. The principle has never been
implemented by rules which would constitute an effective and practical system
of creditor protection. There have almost never been statutes fixing substantial
minimum capital before debts may be incurred. Nor, in recent years, have there
been statutes restricting corporate power to incur debts in excess of a prescribed
ratio to capital invested. Corporate promoters have usually been left free to fix
the amount of the creditors' margin of safety, perhaps on the assumption that
creditors could ascertain the amount of the capital and be guided accordingly.
One may be skeptical as to whether many creditors have extended credit in
reliance on the par value of issued stock or the stated value of no par shares.
Such reliance would scarcely be intelligent in view of the absence of legal limita-
tions on the incurring of further debts and the mortgaging of corporate assets to
secure such advances. Intelligent credit investigation would devote little atten-
tion to issued stock as compared with such factors as recent earnings and the
character and liquidity of the assets. The problem of the short-term creditor,
furtherm6re, is very different from that of long-term creditors. For neither of
them does the traditional capital impairment rule afford an adequate basis of
reliance. Both types of creditors frequently insist upon contractual limitations
on the incurring of further debts or the distribution of dividends.7
It would probably be impossible to prescribe by statute an adequate system
of creditor protection through regulation of debt and asset ratios.The require-
ments of different industries are exceedingly diverse. The work of the Securities
and Exchange Commission under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 shows how difficult the task is, even for an administrative body dealing
with a single industry and with detailed controls over security issues and ac-
counting 8
6 Some states have enacted specific provisions covering the problem. The recently adopted
corporation statutes of Illinois, Ohio, and California prohibit cash dividends from unrealized
appreciation. Ill. Rev. Stat. (i941) C. 32, § 157.41(c); Ohio Code Ann. (Throckmorton, i94o)§ 8623-38(b); Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, i941) § 346. Michigan apparently allows distribu-
tion of unrealized appreciation to preferred stockholders, but the source of the dividend must
be disclosed. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1937) § 21.22. Wisconsin, surprisingly, provides
that "any corporation which has invested net earnings or income in permanent additions to
its value, may declare a dividend either in money or in stock to the extent of the net earnings
or income so invested or of the said increase in the value of its property; but the total amount
of such dividend shall not exceed the actual cash value of the assets owned by the corporation
in excess of its total liabilities, including its capital stock." Wis. Stat. (i939) § 182.19(2).
California prohibits even stock dividends from unrealized appreciation. Cal. Civ. Code
(Deering, 1941) § 346a.
7 Writing Down Fixed Assets and Stated Capital, 44 Yale L.J. 1025, 1043 (1935).
8 In the Matter of Consumers Power Co., S.E.C. Holding Co. Act Release No. 1854 (i939);
In the Matter of Engineers Public Service Co., S.E.C. Holding Co. Act Release No. 2535
(1941).
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In the light of such efforts the traditional dividend law appears an exceed-
ingly crude type of control. The capital impairment rule, as applied by the
courts, may in some cases appear unduly lax and in other cases unduly strict,
especially after periods of far-reaching business changes. Perhaps with such
situations in mind legislatures have left corporations with wide powers to reduce
their capital stock. These provisions furnish a striking illustration of the failure
of modem legislation to carry out the margin of safety principle. With few and
relatively unimportant exceptions, reduction of capital is authorized without
adequate protection for creditors. 9 In many important states, capital may be
drastically reduced and dividend restrictions avoided, subject only to the re-
quirement that assets be kept in the corporation sufficient to cover its debts and
the amount of the reduced capital. Such statutes apparently reflect skepticism
as to the policy underlying the capital impairment rule. Furthermore, the ex-
istence of this large loophole makes it understandable that judges should hesi-
tate to apply the margin of safety principle strictly in other situations. Why
insist on the maintenance of a given margin if the margin itself may be legally
reduced by simple procedures which involve little protection for existing credi-
tors?
If the traditional capital impairment rule is crude and inflexible in its opera-
tion and if the differences among industries and types of loans make it imprac-
ticable to establish margins of safety suggested by sound credit policy, is there
any other alternative? One might suggest substituting for the traditional rules
a simple requirement of due care on the part of the directors, due care in the
light of the amount and due dates of the corporate debts, the extent and
liquidity of the corporate assets, its requirements of working capital, and gen-
eral business conditions. There are vague suggestions of such a rule by way of
dicta in the cases.'0 Furthermore, Section 5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyances Act might be construed to have this effect. This section makes fraudu-
lent a transfer without consideration "when the person making it is engaged in
.... a business .... for which the property remaining in his hands .... is an
unreasonably small capital ...... This provision has seldom been invoked in
corporate dividend casesl' and would probably not be construed to invalidate
a dividend authorized by the general corporation act. It is not inconceivable
that courts might, of their own motion, work out standards of adequate stock
financing to support the corporation's debts. This is suggested by decisions
9 The entire problem and possible remedies are elaborately discussed in Writing Down Fixed
Assets and Stated Capital, 44 Yale LJ. 1025 (1935); Capital Stock Reduction as Affecting the
Rights of Creditors, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 693 (1934).
1O Ballantine has suggested such a rule as more practical than the present, complicated
statutory rules. Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, i Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 357, 371 (1934).
- In re College Chemists, Inc., 62 F. (2d) zo58 (C.C.A. 2d 1933). For the same problem un-
der insurance statutes, see Van Schaick v. Carr et al., io N.Y. Supp. (2d) 567 (S. Ct. 1938).
The possible application of the theory of fraudulent conveyances to improper dividends is dis-
cussed in 2 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences §§ 604, 6o5 (194o).
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which result in subordination of claims of a parent corporation based on ad-
vances to an inadequately financed subsidiary.12 Despite these analogies, sub-
stitution of a general due care standard for dividends would probably be un-
desirable. It may be doubted that such a statute would often result in actual
recovery from a director, especially if the alternatives were no liability or joint
liability for the full amount of the illegal dividends.
There is one situation, however, where a due care rule would seem desirable:
the situation of the corporation whose fixed assets have suffered a shrinkage in
value. Randall v. Bailey apparently not only permits use of increased values for
dividend purposes but also requires the use of decreased values. This aspect of
the decision will probably give serious concern to corporation lawyers. Indeed,
one may question the wisdom of a rule which may require frequent appraisals of
fixed assets and going concern values if directors are to be safe in distributing
current earnings. Prior to Randall v. Bailey, while the authority is meager, it has
been generally thought that account need not be taken of unrealized shrinkages
in fixed asset values.' 3 In many cases the dividend may be entirely sound de-
spite such shrinkages. In other cases, however, where serious and permanent
impairment of earning capacity is indicated, the dividend may leave creditors
with clearly inadequate protection. Here, the due care requirement might oper-
ate usefully to prevent injury to creditors in the more serious cases.
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS-CONTROL OF THE JUDICIARY
BY UPPER COURTS
Default by the surety on a bail bond instigated an investigation by the Chi-
cago Bar Association of the practice of municipal court judges in the approval of
such bonds. As a result of this investigation the Association, acting as commis-
sioners of the court, brought disbarment proceedings against the defendant, a
municipal court judge. The commissioners charged that the respondent's fail-
ure to ascertain the financial responsibility of those posting bonds "tended to
bring the bar and the judiciary into ill repute and to obstruct justice." They
contended, moreover, that such carelessness violated the municipal court rule
which established as "the duty of a judge [the ascertainment of) the condition of
the title and the value of the real estate scheduled."' The complaint was held
dismissed. In re McGarry.2
12 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (x939); Israels, The Implications and
Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 42 Col. L. Rev. 376 (1942).
'3 2 Bonbright, Valuation of Property 924-25 (1937). But see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Grand
Rapids, G.H. & M. Ry. Co., 7 F. Supp. 5II (Mich. 1931); Vogtman v. Merchants' Mortgage
and Credit Co., 2o Del. Ch. 364, ,78 Atl. 99 (1935).
x Rule No. 9 of the Municipal Court of Chicago. The rule is quoted in part in the instant
case, In re McGarry, 380 Ill. 359, 362, 44 N.E. (2d) 7, 9 (1942).
2,380 Ill. 359,44 N.E. (2d) 7 (1942).
